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1 Introduction
In the face of severe dislocations in nancial markets and profound declines in economic
activity, monetary authorities have taken extraordinary measures beyond lowering short-
term policy rates using the size and structure of their balance sheets (Borio and Disyatat,
2010; Durré and Pill, 2012). These alternative measures have been adopted for two main
reasons. First, nominal short-term interest rates reached the lower bound during this period
in many countries, losing their ability to stimulate the economy (Reifschneider andWilliams,
2000). Second, disruptions in the nancial system generated large losses and a¤ected the
liquidity and solvency of both banks and borrowers.
One noteworthy example of an unconventional monetary policy (UMP, hereafter) is the
Maturity Extension Program carried out by the Federal Reserve (FED) and consisting of
sterilized operations, buying long-term Treasuries and, simultaneously, selling some of the
short-term issues. The FED also followed a large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) programme of
mortgage-backed securities with the aim of increasing market liquidity and reducing mort-
gage interest rates (credit easing). Nevertheless, the most popular LSAP across monetary
authorities in the recent crisis has been the so-called quantitative easing (QE), based on
the creation of money to buy assets. While the FED bought Treasuries, agency debt and
agency-backed mortgage securities, the Bank of England purchased government bonds from
the non-bank private sector. Although the main objective, in both cases, was to a¤ect
yields on assets, the European Central Bank (ECB) used QE to mitigate liquidity prob-
lems within the banking system. More specically, it carried out repurchase agreements
providing long-term loans in exchange for bank loans and non-government bonds.
The e¤ectiveness of these UMPs, which aim to restore the functioning of the nancial
system, has been an object of debate since their inception (Joyce et al., 2012). Nevertheless,
their inuence on credit markets and the real economy are not well understood yet. Lenza
et al. (2010) argue that QE mainly a¤ected interest rates - in particular, money market
spreads - rather than only generating quantitative e¤ects in the money supply. These
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authors also discuss alternative channels through which UMPs can be transmitted into the
economy. In this respect, non-standard measures can inuence bank lending through the
expansion of the monetary base, the level of the overnight interest rate determining the
access to liquidity in the money market or the expectations about the path of future policy
decisions that a¤ect the slope of the money market yield curve. It is worth noting that,
despite the success of these measures in restoring stability to the nancial sector and the ow
of credit to nancial markets through the above-mentioned mechanisms, borrowing costs
have not fallen to levels commensurate with the magnitude of the measures implemented
by the monetary authorities. Cukierman (2013) also notes the importance of this anomaly
and suggests that it is yet to be determined whether the transmission of monetary policy
to commercial bankslending rates di¤ers between normal times and periods of distress.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 illustrates that central bank cuts of the short-term policy rate to levels close
to the zero lower bound - and subsequent increases of the monetary base - have not meant
a similar reduction of the credit interest rates that determine borrowing costs for the non-
nancial sector. The dynamics of the o¢ cial and the credit interest rates have been plotted
for the United States (US) and the euro area (EA). The spreads between these interest
rates in each economy are also shown. These graphs reect two stylized facts of interest
rate dynamics: rst, credit interest rates follow the upward and downward movements of
the o¢ cial interest rate; and second, there is a spread between the two time series that
is usually interpreted as evidence of credit risk in nancial institutions. It is, however,
surprising that the dynamics of the spreads for the US and the EA show di¤erent patterns
in the wake of the 2007-2008 nancial turmoil. Whereas the US credit spread decreases
after the crisis to 3% and remains constant afterwards, the credit spread corresponding to
the EA displays a signicant increase in the aftermath of the crisis and follows an upward
trend from 2010 onwards. This contrast in the dynamics of the interest rate spreads may
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be due to the di¤erences in the implementation of UMPs across the two economic areas
considered. Whereas the US mainly embarked on exchange programmes to swap troubled
assets for government bonds and other risk-free assets, the rescue packages of the EA mainly
consisted of creating lending facilities that provided unlimited access to credit from the ECB
to nancial institutions.
This paper proposes a theoretical model that can o¤er some insights into the nature
of the borrowing spreads in credit markets and, in particular, into the structural variables
that determine the credit interest rate in equilibrium. These insights are further explored
to assess the implications of the implementation of these two di¤erent UMPs - lending
facilities and swap programmes - on the credit interest rate. We compare the success of
these measures in reducing both the credit interest rate and its spread with the short-term
policy rate. To do this, we deploy a framework based on the bank-lending channel that
relates the optimal supply of credit by commercial banks with the interest rate that should
be observed in equilibrium in the credit market. The transmission of monetary policy takes
place as the pass-through from the policy rate to the interest rate on bank loans and, hence,
alters both their cost and the amount of credit rms and households have access to. In the
proposed model, the pass-through is a function of the fraction of the total amount of loans
by commercial banks that is borrowed from the central bank. A complete pass-through
is, theoretically, achieved if commercial banks solely rely on the central bank to provide
lending to the non-nancial sector and if there is perfect competition in the banking sector.
Otherwise, variables such as the interbank money market interest rate, the value of assets
held as collateral on defaulted loans and the default rate play a key role in determining the
credit interest rate in equilibrium.
The comparison of the interest rates for credit in three scenarios - a baseline charac-
terized by the inaction of the central bank, the creation of lending facilities and the imple-
mentation of swap programmes - is carried out using a counterfactual analysis. The main
predictions of our theoretical model are that lending facilities are appropriate measures
for reducing the credit interest rate when the assets held by banks as collateral lose their
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value and when the risk premium on the interbank money market is high. Otherwise, this
unconventional measure may raise borrowing costs for the non-nancial sector more than
in the baseline case. Similarly, the model predicts the relative success of swap programmes
in reducing the credit interest rate with respect to the baseline if the return on government
bonds is higher than that provided by the assets held as collateral for defaulted loans.
Our analysis also provides some insights into the relative performance of the above-
mentioned UMPs. Lending facilities outperform swap programmes when the risk premium
on the interbank money market is sizeable and the yield on government bonds is low.
The fraction of aggregate bank lending that is obtained from the central bank also has
an important role in determining the e¢ cacy of these programmes. The proposed model
shows that the greater the reliance of the banking sector on central bank lending during
normal periods, the more di¢ cult it is for lending facilities to reduce the credit interest
rate and, hence, to restore access to credit for the non-nancial sector. Swap programmes
also perform better than lending facilities in these cases. A similar outcome is observed for
the fraction of aggregate bank lending that is held as remunerated excess reserves in the
central bank because it is more di¢ cult for lending facilities to reduce the credit interest
rate as the quantity of excess reserves grows. In contrast, a higher loan default rate favours
the implementation of lending facilities compared to swap programmes and the inaction
represented by the baseline.
Furthermore, a quantitative assessment of the proposed model has been carried out
with real data from the US and the EA. In both cases, the simulated equilibrium outcomes
provide ample support for the implementation of swap programmes to reduce the credit
interest rate with respect to the baseline scenario. Nonetheless, this simulation exercise
raises some doubts about the success of lending facilities. In fact, we observe that, in
market conditions such as those in the EA, lending facilities would only be able to reduce
the credit interest rate beyond that in the baseline if the spread on the interbank money
market is su¢ ciently large to o¤set the negative e¤ects of the return on the collateral assets,
the reward on excess reserves and the amount of credit borrowed from the central bank.
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The reason is that the European banking sector is characterized by a stronger presence of
central bank loans within the commercial banksbalance sheet liabilities than in the US
and by a solid portfolio of secured bank loans.
The present paper is related to the contribution made by Brei et al. (2013) who ana-
lyze whether the rescue measures adopted by the monetary authorities during the global
nancial crisis of 2008-2009 helped to sustain bank lending supply. Using a novel dataset
covering large international banks, these authors conclude that bank recapitalisations may
not translate into greater credit supply until commercial banksbalance sheets are su¢ -
ciently strengthened. Christiano and Ikeda (2011) also focus on the bank-lending channel
to assess the impact of UMPs on economic conditions, in order to determine which asset
market program, and at what scale, should be undertaken. By studying moral hazard and
adverse selection models of nancial frictions, these authors explore di¤erent channels by
which the e¤ects of UMPs might have occured. Related studies considering the e¤ects of
government asset purchases are those by Moore (2009) and Kiyotaki and Moore (2012). We
also provide insights on how competition in the banking sector inuences the bank-lending
channel corroborating the empirical ndings of Fungáková et al. (2014), according to which
the transmission of monetary policy is less pronounced for banks with extensive market
power. Finally, our work is related to that of Cukierman (2014) who compares the policies
implemented by the ECB and the FED during the global nancial crisis as well as the
behavior of EA and US banks.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a partial equilibrium
model for the credit market that takes into account the balance sheet structure of commer-
cial banks, the probability of loan default and the existence of an interbank money market.
Building on this model, Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of the implementation of UMPs on
the credit interest rate in equilibrium and determines the inuence of excess reserves on
it. Section 4 presents a simulation exercise that illustrates the functioning of the model in
di¤erent scenarios. Section 5 provides an assessment of how sensitive our ndings are to
the introduction of risk aversion and the consideration of alternative specications for the
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default rate and the share of deposits held as excess reserves in the central bank. Section 6
concludes.
2 A model for the credit market
In this section, a theoretical framework that builds on the balance sheets of commercial
banks is proposed to describe the bank-lending channel of monetary policy. The model
considers a banking sector comprised of N banks that di¤er in the level of deposits held by
their customers. Following traditional reserve management models such as Orr and Mellon
(1961), Niehans (1978) and Baltensperger (1980), these deposits are exogenous and depend
on stochastic ows. Commercial banks borrow funds from the central bank at the o¢ cial
interest rate and trade in an interbank money market where funds from banks with an
excess of deposits from customers are channelled to banks with a shortage.
The competition faced by commercial banks is reected in the assumption that they are
price takers. This entails that the interest rate on banksdeposits id and the interest rate on
the interbank money market im are determined exogenously. In addition, and following the
empirical evidence, the equilibrium interest rate of the interbank money market is assumed
to be higher than the o¢ cial interest rate ir. The latter and the interest rate on reserves ~{r
held in the central bank in excess of the minimum reserve maintenance ratio 0 < r < 1 are
set by the central bank, who is the monopolistic supplier of the monetary base.
Our framework is characterized by a representative commercial bank that solves a static
prot maximization problem with a single creditor type. This choice is considered for
two reasons: rst, for the sake of simplicity and clarity in the derivation of optimality
conditions; and second, in the belief that the model is able to reect the main features
of the bank-lending channel and the e¤ect of UMPs on commercial banksbalance sheets.
This theoretical framework could easily be generalized to accommodate an innite number
of time periods in the objective function and di¤erent creditor types with distinct default
rates. These features would add exibility to the model through dynamics in the variables
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involved and the relevant interest rates but at the expense of more convoluted and di¢ cult
to interpret equilibrium conditions.
The result of this optimizing behavior is the supply of loans by a commercial bank whose
balance sheet satises that
QB=NB +Rmin + ER = QCB=B +QB=B +D: (1)
The asset side is made up of the quantity of funds lent by the bank, QB=NB, and the
level of minimum reserves Rmin = rD, with D the level of deposits made by customers.
ER denotes the deposits by the commercial bank beyond Rmin held in the central bank
as excess reserves. The liability side is given by the credit obtained from the central bank
QCB=B, the amount of lending nanced through the interbank money market QB=B and
customer deposits.
The balance sheet (1) provides banks a prot that is determined by the di¤erence be-
tween the returns on the assets and the interest rates paid on the liabilities. Furthermore,
the asset side of the balance sheet is a¤ected by the occurrence of defaults of a fraction of
the total supply of loans. The default rate is dened as p(QB=NB) =
R QB=NB
0 f(z)dq, with
0 < f(z) < 1 the probability of default on an innitesimal loan. The latter corresponds to
an individual within a continuum of borrowers in the banks credit portfolio. The proba-
bility of default is assumed to depend on a set of factors (z) that are idiosyncratic to the
individual but exogenous to the banks optimization problem. Thus,
p(QB=NB) = f(z)QB=NB: (2)
The banks prot function is
 = ic

1  p(QB=NB)

QB=NB +eicp(QB=NB)QB=NB + irRmin +eirER
 irQCB=B   imQB=B   idD; (3)
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where ic denotes the interest rate on loans to the non-nancial sector and eic is the net
return on the assets held as collateral for defaulted loans, such that 0  eic < ic; the case of
uncollateralized debt corresponds to eic = 0.
The prot function (3) can be rearranged in terms of QB=NB. To do this, we assume
that the amount of funds borrowed from the central bank is a fraction of total lending:
QCB=B = QB=NB, with 0 <   1. A value of this parameter smaller than one also
reects constraints on the monetary base provided by the central bank. This is the case, for
example, when the aggregate demand for credit by commercial banks is much higher than
the monetary base targeted by the central bank, implying that each bank is only allocated
a fraction of its total demand. Similarly, the level of excess reserves held by the commercial
bank is assumed to be a xed proportion of its total lending implying that ER = QB=NB,
with 0   < 1. The robustness of the results to this assumption is discussed in Section 5.
In this context, the optimal supply of loans by a commercial bank is the solution to
max
QB=NB
n
[(ic   im) + (im   ir)+eir ]QB=NB   eD   (ic  eic)f(z)Q2B=NBo ; (4)
where eD = [(id   im)  (ir   im)r]D, that yields
QsB=NB =
(ic   im) + (im   ir)+eir
2f(z)(ic  eic) : (5)
An aggregate demand for credit is required in order to determine the equilibrium interest
rate for the non-nancial sector. For simplicity, we consider this demand to be perfectly
inelastic with respect to the credit interest rate1:
QDB=NB = Y: (6)
1A similar assumption xing loan demand is imposed by DellAriccia et al. (2014) to analyze the case of
a monopolist facing an inelastic demand function.
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Therefore, the credit interest rate in equilibrium is
ic =
ir + (1  )im  eir   2eicY f(z)=N
1  2Y f(z)=N : (7)
This expression establishes that the loan market interest rate depends on the structure
of the liability side of commercial banksbalance sheets. In particular, the share of loans
borrowed from the central bank determines the extent of the pass-through from the inter-
bank and short-term policy rates to the credit interest rate. The model also predicts an
increase in the interest rate for credits when the net return on the assets held as collateral
on secured loans falls. Similarly, expression (7) is a positive function of individual loans
probability of default. The existence of a reward for excess reserves held in the central bank
decreases the equilibrium interest rate due to the reduction of aggregate credit supply to
the non-nancial sector. The degree of competition in the banking sector also inuences
the credit interest rate. An increase in the number of banks reduces this interest rate at the
expense of nullifying the role of the collateral. Expression (7) also shows that, in a perfectly
competitive banking sector (N ! 1) without excess reserves and in the absence of a risk
premium on the interbank money market, the credit interest rate in equilibrium is equal to
the o¢ cial interest rate.
Rearranging expression (7) we can obtain the credit interest rate spread over the short-
term policy rate as a function of the corresponding spreads in the interbank money market
and of the collateral:
ic   ir =
(1  )(im   ir) eir   2(eic   ir)Y f(z)=N
1  2Y f(z)=N : (8)
The following section derives the optimal supply of loans by commercial banks and the
equilibrium interest rate when implementing UMPs that shift the focus of attention from
the o¢ cial interest rate to the monetary base.
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3 Optimal credit supply under the implementation of UMPs
With the implementation of UMPs, central banks increase the monetary base with the aim
of invigorating commercial banksbalance sheets and, as a consequence, restoring the ow
of credit to the non-nancial sector. In the present paper, we focus on two measures widely
implemented by monetary authorities: (i) the creation of lending facilities, and (ii) the
acquisition of government bonds that are swapped for the collateral held by commercial
banks in their portfolio of defaulted loans.
3.1 Central bank lending facilities
Central bank lending facilities have a threefold objective. First, to provide credit to the non-
nancial sector; second, to restore the protability of defaulted loans in commercial banks
balance sheets; and third, to raise funds that can be reinvested as excess reserves in the
central bank. By implementing this UMP, the identity of the balance sheet (1) is modied
to reect that the total amount of funds borrowed from the central bank is QCB=B =
QB=NB+L
, with L denoting the loan used to restore the protability of troubled assets.
Therefore, L is the counterpart of the amount of defaulted loans p(QB=NB)QB=NB on the
liability side. Without loss of generality, we assume that lending facilities only apply to
defaulted loans and ignore their e¤ects on other assets on the banks balance sheet such as
common stocks or commercial papers.
Therefore, the access to lending facilities expands the asset side of the banks balance
sheet by a quantity equal to the amount of defaulted loans, satisfying that
QB=NB + p(QB=NB)QB=NB +Rmin + ER = QB=NB + L
 +QB=B +D: (9)
The banks prot maximization problem is equal to (4), but replacing (ic eic) by ir. The
reason is that commercial banks use the funds lent by the monetary authority to restore
the protability of defaulted loans, implying three e¤ects on the objective function: rst,
the term (ic  eic)p(QB=NB)QB=NB is nullied; second, the additional assets obtained from
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the loan provide a return ic; and third, the loan L used to restore the value of these assets
is paid at an interest ir.
Under these conditions, the optimal loan supply schedule of a commercial bank is
Qs1B=NB =
(ic   im) + (im   ir)+eir
2irf(z)
: (10)
Proceeding as in (7), the equilibrium credit interest rate is
irepc = ir + (1  )im  eir + 2irf(z)YN ; (11)
its spread with respect to the short-term policy rate being:
irepc   ir = (1  )(im   ir) eir + 2irf(z)YN : (12)
The success of lending facilities in reducing this spread can be assessed through a com-
parison between the equilibrium credit interest rate in (11) and that obtained from inaction
of the central bank, characterized by the baseline in (7). In doing so, we implicitly assume
that the values of market variables such as the risk premium on the interbank money mar-
ket, the parameter  and the default rate f(z) are exogenously determined and remain the
same across expressions2. This comparison reveals that the implementation of lending facil-
ities reduces the credit spread below that in the baseline scenario discussed in the previous
section if eic < (1  )(im   ir) eir + 2irf(z)Y
N
: (13)
This condition reects the adequacy of lending facilities for reducing borrowing costs if
the value of the collateral on defaulted loans is low and the risk premium on the interbank
money market is high. Interestingly, expression (13) is likely not to be satised when the
2An alternative modelling strategy would be to consider that these variables respond to the stimulus
induced by the UMP. We should note that, in this case, the comparison of the credit interest rates under the
creation of lending facilities and the baseline scenario is not straightforward because the interbank money
market rate and the default rate are endogenously determined.
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interbank money market exhibits borrowing costs similar to the short-term policy interest
rate.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows, for reasonable values of the parameters (see Section 4), the e¤ects of
increases in the model parameters on the relative e¤ectiveness of lending facilities with
respect to the baseline scenario. The plotted lines represent the pairs of values of the
net return on the collateral and the amount of excess reserves for which expression (13)
holds with equality. The coloured areas below these lines correspond to those parameter
combinations for which the equilibrium credit interest rate under the implementation of
lending facilities is lower than in the baseline model.
Figure 2(a) illustrates how the ability of lending facilities in reducing the credit spread
changes as the risk premium on the interbank money market increases. This is reected
in parallel shifts of the equivalence lines away from the origin. Figure 2(b) shows how the
region characterizing the outperformance of lending facilities shrinks as the interest rate
on excess reserves rises. Figure 2(c) analyzes the sensitivity of condition (13) to changes
in the amount of credit from the central bank. It implies that the higher its amount the
lower the number of parameter combinations for which the UMP is able to decrease the
credit interest rate with respect to the baseline. Finally, Figure 2(d) illustrates the impact
of concentration in the banking sector, showing that an increase in the number of banks
reduces the region of lending facilitiesrelative outperformance.
It is worth noting that condition (13) can be expressed in terms of the percentage of
credit from the monetary authority as
 < 1 
eic +eir
im   ir +
2irf(z)
im   ir
Y
N
; (14)
establishing the amount of borrowing from the central bank that is compatible with the
superiority of lending facilities for di¤erent combinations of the model parameters.
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3.2 Government bonds purchases
The second UMP under scrutiny in the present paper is the implementation of swap pro-
grammes characterized by the creation of monetary base by central banks to purchase
government bonds that are exchanged for commercial banks troubled assets. As in the
previous scenario, we identify toxicassets with defaulted loans and ignore the e¤ects of
swap programmes on other assets on the banks balance sheet. Under this scheme, com-
mercial banks obtain a net return ig - instead of eic - on their share of defaulted loans
p(QB=NB)QB=NB. Therefore, the balance sheet identity (1) becomes
(1  p(QB=NB))QB=NB +G+Rmin + ER = QCB=B +QB=B +D; (15)
where G = p(QB=NB)QB=NB denotes the amount of government bonds swapped by the
commercial bank in return for its portfolio of defaulted loans; QCB=B = QB=NB, as in the
baseline scenario.
The banksprot maximization problem (4) is modied to
max
fQB=NBg
n
[(ic   im) + (im   ir)+eir ]QB=NB   eD   (ic   ig)f(z)Q2B=NBo : (16)
Its solution leads to the optimal loan supply to the non-nancial sector when implemen-
tating this UMP:
Qs2B=NB =
(ic   im) + (im   ir)+eir
2f(z)(ic   ig) : (17)
Aggregating for all commercial banks, and considering the aggregate demand for credit
(6), the equilibrium interest rate is given by
iswpc =
ir + (1  )im  eir   2f(z)ig YN
1  2f(z)YN
; (18)
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and its spread over the short-term policy rate can be expressed as
iswpc   ir =
(1  )(im   ir) eir   2f(z)(ig   ir)YN
1  2f(z)YN
: (19)
Using the same type of counterfactual analysis as in the previous subsection, the suc-
cess of this policy with respect to the baseline and the lending facilities scenarios can be
established. The comparison of (7) and (18) shows that swap programmes are successful
in reducing borrowing costs when the return on government bonds is higher than that on
the collateral on defaulted loans. Meanwhile, the comparison of (11) and (18) reveals that
the creation of lending facilities reduces the credit spread with respect to that under swap
programmes if
ig < (1  )(im   ir) eir + 2irf(z)Y
N
: (20)
This condition is similar to (13) and highlights the importance of the interbank market
risk premium for credit conditions and the negative inuence that rewarding excess reserves
may have on borrowing costs. It is worth mentioning that the same analysis to that carried
out for lending facilities in Figure 2 also applies here, but considering the government bond
interest rate instead of the net return on the collateral. In addition, expression (20) can be
expressed in terms of the percentage of credit borrowed from the central bank as
 < 1  ig +
eir
im   ir +
2irf(z)
im   ir
Y
N
; (21)
determining the values of  for which lending facilities outperform swap programmes for
di¤erent combinations of the other model parameters.
4 Quantitative model assessment
A simulation exercise that illustrates the predictions of our theoretical framework is carried
out in this section. The main goal is to analyze the supply of credit by commercial banks
under the three scenarios described in the preceding sections. In particular, we study how
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the conditions that characterize the relative performance across measures change with the
relevant model parameters.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
The values for the parameters have been chosen to suit data observed in the US and
the EA during the period 2006-2012. With this aim, aggregate monetary and nancial
information for these economic areas have been extracted from the FRED database (St.
Louis FED) and the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. The description of the variables in
our theoretical model and their simulation counterparts is reported in Tables 1 and 2 for
the US and the EA, respectively. As can be observed in Table 1, the selected value for the
short-term policy interest rate is 2% in the US, where excess reserves are considered to be
rewarded at a rate equal to 0:25%. Banks face a common loan default rate of 4% and the
net return on the assets held as collateral is 2%. While the fraction of total lending held as
excess reserves in the FED is 2%, the corresponding fraction borrowed by commercial banks
from it is 3%. Finally, we have chosen an interest rate in the interbank money market of
5% and a return on government bonds of 4%.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure 3 compares the credit supply schedule in the baseline scenario (5) to those ob-
tained when implementing UMPs (10) and (17). The sensitivity analysis considers the
displacements of the optimal loan supply derived from increases in the interbank money
market (im = 0:05; 0:06; 0:07; left panel) and in the fraction of total lending that is bor-
rowed from the central bank ( = 0:03; 0:13; 0:23; right panel). The results show the
outperformance of both UMPs with respect to the baseline in easing access to credit. More
specically, the graphs in the left panel of Figure 3 conrm the success of lending facilities
and swap programmes in reducing the credit spread for di¤erent values of the interbank
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money market rate. It can also be observed that the latter plays a signicant role in assess-
ing which measure is more appropriate. The graph at the bottom reinforces the ndings
in Figure 2(a) regarding the outperformance of lending facilities over swap programmes as
the interbank money market rate increases. However, it is worth mentioning that, for the
initial values tting US data (solid lines) swap programmes display a marginally better
performance.
The sensitivity of the results to the composition of the liability side of commercial banks
balance sheets is depicted in the right panel of Figure 3. The simulation exercise reects that
increases in the amount of borrowing from the monetary authority should reduce borrowing
costs to the non-nancial sector. The graph at the bottom also shows the outperformance
of swap programmes over lending facilities. Interestingly, the convexity of the loan supply
schedule for swap programmes suggests a more rapid increase of the credit interest rate
with respect to the lending facilities scenario, implying a better performance of the latter
for large values of the credit stock.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Figure 4 presents the results obtained from a similar analysis for the EA. As reported in
Table 2, the initial values that characterize the baseline model in this case are a short-term
policy rate of 3% and a reward for reserves held in excess of 0:2%. The common loan default
rate is equal to 4% and the net return on the collateral for these non-performing assets is
2%. The fraction of total lending held as excess reserves by commercial banks is 1%, the
interbank money market rate is 5% and the return on government bonds is equal to 4%.
Finally, the percentage of the total amount of loans that is borrowed from the ECB is 7%.
The simulation exercise with European data yields similar results to those for the US.
The important di¤erence in the amount of money borrowed from the central bank in these
two economic areas is reected in the graphs at the bottom of Figure 4 where the outperfor-
mance of swap programmes is more apparent. The creation of lending facilities only displays
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a better performance for increases in the interbank money market rate or for large values
of the credit supply. These ndings highlight the close connection between the composition
of the liability side of commercial banksbalance sheets, the credit stock and the optimal
choice of the UMP to be implemented.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
The graphs at the top of Figure 5 illustrate the relevance of condition (14) for the US
and EA banking sectors, while the graphs at the bottom reect the implications of condition
(21). In both cases, the term reecting credit demand (Y=N) has been replaced by its
supply (QB=NB). The upper graphs analyze the sensitivity of (14) to an increase in the net
return on the collateral from 2% (black solid line) to 3% (black dashed line). In addition,
the lower graphs show the sensitivity of (21) to a decrease in the return on government
bonds from 4% (black solid line) to 3% (black dashed line). The red solid lines correspond
to the observed fraction of borrowing from the central bank in the US (3%) and the EA
(7%), respectively.
The results reported in Figure 5 provide further support to lending facilities as measure
that is potentially able to reduce the credit interest rate in the US. The solid lines corre-
sponding to condition (14) determine the values of  that are compatible with the success
of lending facilities. These values increase with credit supply with a slope that depends
positively on the short-term policy rate and the default rate, and negatively on the risk pre-
mium on the interbank money market. The results shown reect earlier ndings according
to which higher values of the collateral reduce the success of lending facilities in decreasing
the credit spread. In fact, for the US example, a 1% increase in the net return on the
collateral assets implies a failure of this UMP in easing credit conditions. A similar analysis
concerning condition (21) has been carried out, reecting the outperformance of swap pro-
grammes over lending facilities for the observed value of  in the US, regardless the amount
of credit supplied to the market. These results conrm the adequacy of swap programmes
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implemented by the FED during the recent nancial crisis in reducing borrowing costs to
the non-nancial sector.
The simulation exercise with European data suggests a poor performance of lending
facilities in reducing borrowing costs. In particular, condition (14) is violated for low values
of credit supply if the return on the collateral is 2%. A higher value of this parameter (3%)
results in stronger rejections of this UMP as a valid instrument for easing access to credit.
Similarly, the graph at the bottom right of Figure 5 provides overwhelming evidence of the
outperformance of swap programmes over lending facilities raising some doubts about the
suitability of the lending facilities created by the ECB during recent crisis episodes.
5 Robustness analysis
In the preceding sections, we have investigated the equilibrium credit interest rate consid-
ering that banks are risk neutral and specic functions for excess reserves holdings and the
default rate on the portfolio of banksloans. The robustness of our ndings to these three
assumptions is analyzed in the present section.
This is done by the introduction of risk aversion into banks optimal behavior as-
suming that they maximize a power utility function of prots reecting constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA). Furthermore, as a second robustness exercise, the functional form
p(QB=NB) = f(z)QB=NB is replaced by a more general function reecting the existence of
comovements between the default rate and the amount of credit to the non-nancial sector3.
After these modications, the prot function for the baseline scenario (3) changes to
(QB=NB) = f(i; ; p(QB=NB))QB=NB   eD; (22)
with f(i; ; p(QB=NB)) = [(ic   im)   (ir   im)   (ic  eic)p(QB=NB)]. The corresponding
3As some authors have pointed out (Benes et al., 2014), this default rate can also be modelled as a
function of non-performing loans, loss-given default, and risk of default which could potentially be dependent
on collateral asset prices.
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optimization problem (4) becomes
max
fQB=NBg
u
 
(QB=NB)

(23)
with
u(x) =
8><>:
x1 
1  for  > 0 and  6= 1;
ln(x) for  = 1:
(24)
For expositional convenience, we rst analyze the logarithmic function. In this case, the
relevant optimization problem is
ln eD + max
fQB=NBg
ln

f(i; ; p(QB=NB))QB=NBeD   1

(25)
and its rst order condition
@f(i; ; p(QB=NB))
@QB=NB
QB=NB + f(i; ; p(QB=NB)) = 0: (26)
The solution to this equation can be expressed as
QsB=NB =
(ic   im)  (ir   im)  (ic  eic)p(QB=NB)
(ic  eic) @p(QB=NB)=@QB=NB : (27)
The same optimality condition is obtained if the logarithmic utility function is replaced
by a function reecting risk aversion and characterized by  6= 1 in the above representa-
tion of u(x). This nding reveals the robustness of our results to the specication of the
commercial banks objective function within the CRRA family. It should also be noted
that the optimal credit supply in (27) is consistent with the specication of the default rate
p(QB=NB) in previous sections. This expression does not provide, however, a meaningful
result if the default rate is constant because, in this case, the maximization problem (25)
does not have an interior solution. This result illustrates the importance of the specication
of the default rate in determining the existence of an optimal supply of credit. In fact, this
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variable is the only factor reecting banksrisk aversion in our theoretical framework.
The last of the robustness checks that has been carried out consists of assessing the
impact of changes in the specication of excess reserves holdings. We take a more general
view on the function considered before and assume that ER = h(QB=NB)QB=NB, with
h(QB=NB) a positive and potentially increasing function of credit supply. In this case, and
under the scenario deployed for the study of central bank lending facilities4, the relevant
prot function becomes
(QB=NB) = ef(i; ; p(QB=NB); h(QB=NB))QB=NB   eD; (28)
with ef(i; ; p(QB=NB); h(QB=NB)) = [(ic   im)   (ir   im)   (ir   im)p(QB=NB) + (eir  
ir)h(QB=NB)].
The optimal credit supply obtained by solving the corresponding maximization problem
is
QsB=NB =
(ic   im)  (ir   im)

+ p(QB=NB)

+ (eir   ir)h(QB=NB)
(ir   im)@p(QB=NB)=@QB=NB + (ir  eir) @h(QB=NB)=@QB=NB : (29)
This expression highlights the inverse relationship between banksoptimal credit supply
and the level of deposits they maintain in the central bank as excess reserves. Moreover, it
suggests that the equilibrium credit interest rate - obtained from equating M s = NQsB=NB
with Md = Y - increases with h(QsB=NB).
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed a simple theoretical framework to evaluate the success of the
most important UMPs implemented by central banks during the recent crisis episodes. The
spread between the credit interest rate and the short-term policy rate is determined by the
risk premium in the interbank money market, the composition of commercial banksbalance
sheets, the value of the assets held as collateral for defaulted loans and the default rate on
4The analysis of the e¤ect of excess reserves holdings under government swap programmes follows simi-
larly.
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the portfolio of loans. The degree of competition in the banking sector and the amount of
excess reserves maintained in the central bank also play a key role in determining the credit
interest rate in equilibrium.
We conclude that swap programmes are superior to the inaction that characterizes our
baseline scenario and to the creation of lending facilities if the government bond used for the
exchange of assets with the central bank provides high returns and the value of the collateral
assets on defaulted loans is low. This situation is reversed, lending facilities becoming more
sucsessful in easing credit conditions, if the risk premium on the interbank money market
is su¢ ciently high to o¤set the yields of the government bond and the net return obtained
by the collateral. The application of these theoretical insights to real data from the US and
the EA provides further support for the policies implemented by the FED while it raises
some doubts about the choice of lending facilities in banking systems that rely more heavily
on borrowing from the central bank to sustain the creation of credit.
The theoretical framework proposed in the present paper can be extended to consider
that market variables such as the interbank rate, the amount and value of collateral assets
and the default rate are endogenous and, hence, also a¤ected by the implementation of
UMPs in a similar manner as the credit interest rate. In this case, the counterfactual
analysis should also take di¤erences in these variables into account when comparing the
credit interest rates between equilibriums. The consideration of the relative success of
UMPs in these conditions is left for future research.
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Tables and gures
Table 1. Quantitative model assessment. Selection of the parameter values for the United States.
Model FRED database 2006 2008 2012 Simulations
O¢ cial interest rate (ir) E¤ective Federal Funds rate 4.96 1.93 0.14 0.02
Interest rate paid on excess Interest rate paid on excess reserve balances 0.00 0.00 0.25 2.50E-03
reserves (~{r) (2-week maintenance period)
Interbank market rate (im) Interbank rates (3-month/90-day) 1.56 2.97 0.28 0.05
Net return on collateral (~{c) Bank prime loan rate*Percentage of value of 5.20 3.12 2.33 0.02
loans secured by collateral
Government bonds rate (ig) 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate 4.80 3.66 1.80 0.04
Fraction of total lending held as Excess reserves of depository institutions as 0.02 1.53 15.16 0.02
excess reserves () a percentage of credit (all commercial banks)
Fraction of total lending borrowed Credit over total borrowing of depository 2.94E-03 3.01 0.05 0.03
from the central bank () institutions from the FED
Loan probability of default (f(z)) Loan delinquency rate (all commercial banks) 1.57 3.67 5.02 0.04
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Table 2. Quantitative model assessment. Selection of the parameter values for the euro area.
Model ECB Statistical Data Warehouse 2006 2008 2012 Simulations
O¢ cial interest rate (ir) Interest rate for main renancing operations 3.00 3.71 0.75 0.03
Interest rate paid on excess Interest rate for deposit facility 2.00 2.87 0.00 0.02
reserves (~{r)
Interbank market rate (im) Euribor (3-month) 3.08 4.64 0.57 0.05
Net return on collateral (~{c) Interest rate for loans (<1 year)*Percentage of 4.50 4.91 3.19 0.03
loand with collateral (Godlewski and Weill, 2011)
Government bonds rate (ig) Spot rate (all ratings), 10-year maturity 3.98 3.92 3.01 0.04
Fraction of total lending held as Excess reserve maintenance by credit institutions 0.01 0.01 3.31 0.01
excess reserves () as a percentage of their loans to non-MFIs
Fraction of total lending borrowed ECB lending to credit institutions as a percentage 4.52 7.16 9.24 0.07
from the central bank () of their loans to non-MFIs
Loan probability of default (f(z)) Percentage of doubtful and non-performing loans 2.93* 2.54 5.32 0.04
N o t e : * d a t a fo r t h e y e a r 2 0 0 7 .
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Figure 1: Credit (solid) and short-term policy (dashed) rates, 2007:01-2014:10.
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Figure 2: Relative policy e¤ectiveness: Lending facilities vs. baseline. E¤ects of increases in
model parameters (solid to dotted). The coloured areas correspond to a better performance
of lending facilities in reducing the credit interest rate.
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Figure 3: Credit supply curves: Baseline (black), lending facilities (red) and swap pro-
grammes (blue) scenarios. E¤ects of increases in model parameters (solid to dotted) tting
US data (see Table 1).
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Figure 4: Credit supply curves: Baseline (black), lending facilities (red) and swap pro-
grammes (blue) scenarios. E¤ects of increases in model parameters (solid to dotted) tting
EA data (see Table 2).
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Figure 5: Relative policy e¤ectiveness. The areas below the black lines correspond to a
better performance of lending facilities in reducing the credit interest rate. Red horizontal
lines are the observed values for the percentage of commercial bank loans that are borrowed
from the monetary authority. Dashed lines in the upper (lower) panel reect an increase
(decrease) in the net return on the collateral (government bonds rate).
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